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ARE PSYCHOPHYSICAL MODELS OF BEHAVIOR POSSIBLE? 
MARIANNE SHAW 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588 
In "The Correspondence Hypothesis," (Philosophical Review), 
Bruce Goldberg argues that the correspondence hypothesis is an illu-
sion because "B's having the same thought as A" does not entail "B's 
having the same set of mental or neurophysiological properties, i.e., 
brain state or process, as A." If Goldberg is correct, a telling blow has 
been struck against the construction' of information processing and 
psycho linguistic models created with the intention of later incorpora-
tion into neurophysiological models of brain functioning. 
However, while Goldberg is correct in pointing out that two 
individuals can be said to have the same thought and yet not have the 
same set of mental or neurophysiological properties, his more impor-
tant conclusion, viz., that the correspondence hypothesis is an illusion, 
does not follow. His conclusion results from: (I) construing the corres-
pondence hypothesis to mean, "If the thought is the same with respect 
to content, then the set of neurophysiological properties is the same," 
which is insufficient for the purposes of the scientist; and (2) failing 
to notice that there is sufficient reason for claiming that both private 
and public modes of thinking may share properties in common. 
t t t 
The unity of scientific explanation is of concern to scien-
tists and philosophers alike. For example, Brandt and Kim 
have discussed the possibility of correlating mental with phy-
sical phenomena in terms of the "PrinCiple of Simultaneous 
Isomorphism (PSI)." 
PSI: For every phenomenal property M, there is a physi-
cal property P such that it is lawlike and true that 
for every x and every t an M-event (i.e., an event 
involving the instancing of M) occurs to x at t if and 
only if a P-event occurs in the body of x at t; further, 
distinct phenomenal properties have distinct phy-
sical correlates (I 967: 521). 
Recently, however, PSI has been challenged by Bruce 
Goldberg. He argues that PSI, which he calls the correspon-
dence hypothesis, is an illusion. His principal claim is that 
"B's having the same thought as A" does not entail "B's having 
the same set of mental or neurophysiological properties, i.e.,. 
brain state or process, as A." 
The following hypothetical dialogs illustrate Goldberg's 
argument: 
(i) Two farmers talking: 
A: "I was just thinking that if it doesn't rain 
soon the crops will fail." 
B: "I was thinking the same thing." 
Don't assume that because A was thinking of corn 
and B of wheat that what B said is false (1968: 439). 
(ii) A teacher asks her students, "Who was the first 
president of the United States?" 
Student A: silently soliloquizes, "George Wash-
ington." 
Student B: calls to mind a mental image of 
George Washington and recognizes it as a 
likeness of George Washington, first presi-
dent of the United States. 
Student C: calls to mind a mental image of 
George Washington but fails to identify it. 
However, later, when shown a picture of 
George Washington, recognizes him as the 
figure that had appeared before his mind's 
eye. 
Student D: simply straight away, and without 
any mental sound or image, writes down, 
"George Washington was the first president 
of the United States." 
(Goldberg, 1968: 441-444) 
Goldberg focuses his argument on the second hypothetical 
dialog and argues that at least we would want to say that stu-
dents A, B, and D had the same thought, viz., that George 
Washington was the first president of the United States. Stu-
dent C is a troublesome case since he failed to recognize his 
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mental image as one of George Washington when it appeared. 
But however this case is to be decided, Goldberg's argument 
can be put as follows: "Sl has the same thought as S2" does 
not entail "the set of mental properties in virtue of which Sl 
has the thought in question is the same set as that in virtue 
of which S2 can be said to have the thought in question." 
In fact, he argues, nothing can be strictly inferred about 
either S 1 's or S2's mental or neurophysiological properties 
since Sl and S2 can be said to have the same thought without 
silently soliloquizing or picturing anything, as when, e.g., 
Student D simply straight away wrote down, "George Washing-
ton was the first president of the United States." The only 
thing these four cases do have in common is content, but the 
correlation of content with brain state, i.e., neurophysiological 
properties, Goldberg rejects as unintelligible. "Consider what 
it might mean to say that the content of a thought is caused 
by a brain state" (1968: 445). For example, what would it 
mean for the content of "George Washington was the first 
president of the United States" to result from A's neuro-
physical properties? Hence, he concludes, the correspondence 
hypothesis is mere illusion. 
If Goldberg is correct, a telling blow has been struck 
against the construction of information processing and psy-
cholinguistic models created with the intention of later incor-
poration into neurophysiological models of brain function-
ing. However, while Goldberg is correct in pointing out that 
two individuals can be said to "have the same thought" and 
yet not have the same set of neurophysiological properties, I 
will argue in the following that his more important conclu-
sion, viz., that the correspondence hypothesis is an illusion, 
does not follow. 
To see why this is so it is important to get clear about 
what the correspondence hypothesis asserts. Goldberg offers 
the following: "Where there is the same thought there is the 
some brain state" (1968: 439). As stated, however, the claim is 
ambiguous; "same thought" can mean either "same with 
respect to content," or "same with respect to content and 
vehicle of thought." Goldberg uses "same" to mean, "same 
with respect to conten t" only: he argues that "A has the same 
thought as B" is true, in the above case, of A and B where A 
silently soliloquized while B pictured that George Washington 
was the first president of the United States. Hence, for Gold-
berg, the correspondence hypothesis is the assertion, "If two 
thoughts have the same content, then they are correlated with 
the same set of neurophysiological properties." 
But would any psychologist or neurophysiologist hold 
that sameness of content is sufficient for constructing corres-
pondence theories? The answer is clearly no. What is wanted 
by scientists when they construct models of thinking is same-
ness for both content and vehicle of thought. The reason for 
this is transparent. Both psychologists and neurophysiologists 
are interested in the discovery and ultimate decoding of 
processes--psychological and neurophysiological. Hence both 
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criteria of sameness are required. Sameness of vehicle of 
thought is required to isolate kinds of psychological and/Or 
neurophysiological processes, e.g., picturing as opposed to 
silently soliloquizing. And, sameness of content is needed to 
identify further within a given kind of process that particular 
set of mental properties correlated with a given thought, e.g. 
picturing George Washington and recognizing that image as ~ 
likeness of the first president of the United States. Hence, the 
correspondence hypothesis is not simply, "If the thought is 
the same with respect to content, then the correlated set of 
neurophysiological properties is the same," but rather, "If 
the thought is the same both with respect to content and 
vehicle of thought, then the neurophysiological properties are 
the same." Thus, it is only possible on Goldberg's formulation 
of the correspondence hypothesis to correlate two different 
sets of neurophysiological properties with the same thought. 
But let us turn to his more serious objection, viz., that 
from "S 1 has the same thought as S2" we can reasonably 
infer either "S experiences mental events el ... en" or "It 
is not the case that S experiences any mental events." "Ima-
gine that a child writes down the answer but says that no 
images or sounds occurred in his mind" (1968: 443). Clearly, 
mentally picturing and silently soliloquizing a thought neces-
sarily involve mental events; whereas, sketching, speaking, or 
writing down one's thought(s) need not. Therefore, argues 
Goldberg, any correspondence thesis is undermined which 
must claim that for any mental predicate, such as "has a 
thought," there is: (1) a corresponding set of mental proper-
ties, and (2) a correlated set of neurophysiological properties. 
No set of mental properties exists-only behavior. Hence, the 
correspondence hypothesis is an illusion. 
It could be argued that "has a thought" is not appropri-
ately used to refer to written expressions of thought. But let 
us grant the use and see what follows. In order to do so, let 
us employ Goldberg's reasoning in another case. Suppose Sl 
and S2 are both diabetic, and further, that they both have 
diabetic condition a to degree y, i.e., neither require additional 
insulin as long as they exercise control over their diets. Now 
consider the following hypothetical case: S 1 follows his pre· 
scribed diet, while S2 does not and has just eaten a large por-
tion of ice cream and cake with sweetened coffee. It is true to 
say, "SI has the same diabetic disposition as S2'" but clearly 
this does not entail that S 1 and S2 have the same physiological 
state. Thus, from "S has diabetic condition a to degree y" 
we can infer either "S is manifesting symptomatic diabetic 
irregularities" or "S's metabolic state is normal." QED, the 
possibility of constructing a model of diabetes is an illusion. 
Obviously, something has gone wrong, since we already have 
such models. 
Perhaps, Goldberg might reply, the abnormal metabolic 
state is not entailed by "S has diabetic condition a to degree 
y," but rather follows from "S has diabetic condition a to de-
gree y" and "s ingests x amount of sugar." Thus the following 
subjunctive conditional can be formed in the above case, i.e., 
"If any S should have diabetic condition a to degree y and 
ingests x amount of sugar, then abnormal metabolic condi-
tion z would result," whereas no such comparable subjunctive 
conditional can be formulated in the case of simply writing 
down one's thoughts. The formation of subjunctive condi-
tionals (true universal statements whose antecedent has been 
satisfied) is a necessary condition for theory construction. 
(See Nagel, 1961: 68-69). Hence, the cases are not parallel. 
ND correspondence model can be constructed. 
But this move will not work, since it assumes that the 
written or spoken expression of a thought does not presup-
pose the same mental properties as the silent entertaining of 
that thought. But there are grounds. Silently soliloquizing and 
writing down, e.g., the English sentence, "George Washington 
was the first president of the United States," necessarily make 
use of the same concepts and syntax: only the mode of think-
ing about x is different. So, unless an a priori argument can be 
given which rules out the possibility of two modes of think-
ing having properties in common-and that seems unlikely-it 
is clearly possible that writing one's thoughts and silently 
soliloquizing them share common properties. 
But perhaps, it might be objected, that since we are aware 
of mental events when thinking silently to ourselves in words 
or pictures, but not necessarily when writing, speaking, or 
sketching, the two modes of thinking are radically different in 
kind. But are we aware of processes in either case? True, I am 
aware of the "sound" or images of my thoughts when think-
ing to myself, but clearly that mental "sound" or visual pat-
tern is not identical to the process by which it is produced; 
e.g., if Chomsky's analysis is correct, sentences are not identi-
cal to the grammatical transformation of dictionary entries 
from which they result. Moreover, when writing, sketching and 
speaking, we are aware of the vehicle of our thought(s) and 
bear the same relation to its "product" as to our private 
thoughts. In fact, the two modes differ only in terms of public 
accessibility. And even that difference is not sacrosanct. For 
if we are able to construct adequate models of thinking, we 
should be able to "publicly broadcast" on a suitable screen 
the private thoughts of individuals. Hence, in neither case are 
we aware of the mental process per se. And in both, we are 
aware of the vehicle of thought. The two modes of thOUght are 
not radically different in kind. They are merely alternative 
ways for expressing thought. 
The same can be argued for thinking about, e.g., George 
, Washington, by means of mental images and deliberately 
drawing his likeness; both presuppose the same concepts and 
rules for representation (for not just any picture will count as 
a likeness of George Washington in either mode). What is 
needed is a model for artistic modes of thinking. Meanwhile, 
there is sufficient reason to claim that writing, speaking, and 
drawing presuppose the same mental processes as thinking to 
oneself in words or pictures. And thus, we can formulate 
the following subjunctive conditional: "If any S should 
think about x in mode y then correlated mental properties 
mi ... mn would occur at the same time." Simply straight 
away writing down one's thought(s) in the absence of mental 
events, therefore, is not a counterexample to the correspon-
dence hypothesis. 
Admittedly, it may turn out that the psychophysical 
models we construct do not picture reality. But such has 
been the fate of many models offered by scientists, e.g., the 
phlogiston theory of combustion. All that is claimed is that 
such models might reflect reality, not that they necessarily 
do so. Indeed, such is the character of all scientific hypotheses. 
In summary then, while Goldberg is correct in pointing 
out that two individuals can have the same thought and yet 
not have the same set of mental or neurophysiological pro-
perties, his more important conclusion, viz., that the corres-
pondence hypothesis is an illusion, does not follow. His con-
clusion results from: (1) taking the correspondence hypothesis 
to mean, "If the thought is the same with respect to content, 
then the set of neurophysiological properties is the same," 
which as I have shown is insufficient for the purposes of the 
scientist, and (2) failing to notice that there is sufficient rea-
son for claiming that both private and public modes of think-
ing may share properties in common. 
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